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I. Introduction: More Than Ad Hoc Cooperation? 
The fall of the Soviet Union raised great expectations in the western 
world as to the possibility of integrating Russia into a community of 
democratic states.1 Indeed, from a very early stage, the European Union 
tried to steer the transformation of the Russian Federation towards 
democracy and a market economy. From 1991 onwards, the EU became 
the main provider of technical assistance to Russia through the TACIS 
programme and opened a new representation in Moscow.2 In 1994, the 
EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed, 
although due to delays in its ratification it only entered into force in 
1997.3 
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Once the cornerstones for cooperation with Russia were laid, the EU 
formulated its vision of EU-Russian relations in the 1999 Common 
Strategy on Russia.4 However, the Russian response, the 2000-2010 
Medium Term Strategy towards the European Union pointed to the 
existence of conflicting objectives.5 Russia rejected European influence 
on its internal reforms. The ‘Wider Europe’ initiative launched in March 
2003 was followed by the Russian opt-out of the new European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), because of fears that Russia would not be 
treated as an equal partner. A more sectoral approach to EU-Russian 
cooperation in the form of the creation of four ‘common spaces’ 
followed.6 In addition, there is dialogue on energy and human rights 
issues, as well as regional cooperation between Russia and the EU’s 
northern members in the framework of the Northern Dimension.  
Thus, the EU and Russia cooperate on a wide range of fields, from 
foreign policy to trans-border crime, from human rights to market 
liberalisation. This vast array of efforts reflects the importance that the 
EU attaches to its neighbour. In October 1999, Javier Solana declared 
that “to develop the partnership with Russia is […] the most challenging 
task that the Union faces at the beginning of the twenty-first century.”7 
Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour and an important supplier of 
energy. In addition, both the EU and Russia share a neighbourhood that 
could benefit from the stabilising effect of a common EU-Russian 
                                                          
Federation, of the other part,  
ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_russia.pdf, 3 November 2006. 
4
  Cologne European Council, Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 
1999 on Russia, 1999/414/CFSP, 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114137.pdf, 3 November 
2006. 
5
  www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_245.htm, 3 November 2006. 
6
  European Commission, Communication, Wider Europe— Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Brussels, 11 
March 2003, COM(2003) 104 final; for the roadmaps for the Common Economic 
Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space on 
External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture see 
ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/index.htm, 3 November 
2006. 
7
  Javier Solana, The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership, Stockholm, 13 October 1999, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/applications/solana/details.asp?cmsid=
246&BID=107&DocID=59417&insite=1, 17 November 2006.   
 3
strategy. Coordination of their foreign policy positions would allow for 
greater independence from the United States or China.8 
In official discourse, the EU and Russia claim to maintain a 
‘strategic partnership’ based on shared interests and common values 
such as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law.9 Yet, 
the relationship is far from idyllic. Tensions between Georgia and 
Russia as well as differing attitudes on the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine underline that the EU and Russia do not share the same vision 
on the future development of their common neighbourhood. 
Cooperation in the framework of the ‘common spaces’ progresses 
slowly, hampered by differences over environmental policy, visa-free 
travel, cross-border crime, the necessity to open up the Russian market 
and the extent to which Russia should have a say in the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.10 The informal European Council in Lahti 
in October 2006 confirmed the limits of EU-Russian energy 
cooperation, with Russia refusing to grant guarantees of a secure energy 
supply to the EU and hindering European access to its energy market. 
Finally, the current power-centralising and de-democratising trends in 
Russia put into question the existence of the common values the 
strategic partnership is supposedly based upon. 
Hence, in this chapter we argue that the EU and Russia act rather on 
an ad hoc basis than as strategic partners. In order for a relationship to 
be strategic, it needs clear goals and priorities as well as efficient 
instruments. In a strategic partnership open competition between the 
partners should be limited and there should be agreement on a common 
agenda for the realisation of important projects. Since values influence 
the perceived interest of an entity, for example by determining in which 
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direction the EU or Russia want to see their neighbourhood evolve, 
there has to be a critical mass of shared values allowing for a common 
long-term vision.11  
In the next section, underlying factors making the creation of a 
genuine strategic partnership between the EU and Russia complex will 
be analysed. In the second part, it will be pointed out that the ‘common 
values’ of the EU and Russia are in fact diminishing rather than 
increasing. In the final part, energy policy will be used as an example to 
demonstrate how even in fields of ‘pragmatic’ cooperation such as 
energy the EU has thus far failed to develop a strategic vision of its 
relationship with Russia. 
 
II. Obstacles to a Strategic Partnership 
The EU faces two major challenges in its attempt to set up a strategic 
partnership with Russia. On the one hand, its own foreign policy 
approach differs radically from Russia’s. On the other hand, the EU 
finds it hard to ‘speak with one voice’ when it comes to important topics 
such as the promotion of supposedly common values. 
 
A. Divergent Approaches to Foreign Policy 
Russia’s foreign policy approach is realist. International negotiations 
are seen as interest-driven zero-sum-games, with strict reciprocity as an 
important element of agreements. Russia remains attached to the idea of 
an independent state with a strong military and spheres of influence.12  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Russia’s self-perception and 
perception of the EU have changed as a result of both Russian domestic 
affairs and international developments. As the collapse of the Soviet 
Union overshadowed the advances in European integration at the 
beginning of the 1990s, NATO was regarded as the main actor and the 
EU was seen neither as a model nor as a real threat to Russian 
sovereignty and unity. In the late 1990s, however, this indifference 
transformed into irritation and mutual disappointment. First, divergences 
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arose over the accession negotiations with former Soviet satellite states 
in eastern Europe. Russia was disappointed by the lack of support from 
the West in its striving for national unity, while the West was 
disappointed by the speed of reforms in Russia. The strategic Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted in June 2000, defines 
the role and vision of Russia in a global perspective and summarises the 
main priorities and means.13 The document is dominated by the 
perception of an external threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. The preservation and strengthening of the Russian Federation 
as a ‘great power’ is the foremost priority.14 In this perspective, the EU 
appears as an ‘interstate association’ that needs to be taken into account 
for its economic weight, but is not overly important in the field of 
foreign policy. However, the EU was also seen as an ally in Russia’s 
strife against a unilateral world order dominated by the United States.15  
Since the approval of the Foreign Policy Concept an important shift 
in strategy has occurred. Whereas in the year 2000 Russian foreign 
policy actors believed that the Russian Federation lacked the necessary 
means to pursue its ambitious goals, this had changed by 2006: Russia 
experienced relative stability under President Putin, both politically and 
economically, with the notable exception of the war in Chechnya. Its 
economic development together with its position as one of the world’s 
most important energy suppliers granted Russia an economic comeback, 
reflected in Russia’s participation in the G7/G8.16 Today, the EU relies 
on Russian energy resources for between 15 and 20 percent of its needs. 
In addition, high energy prices have led to a large budgetary surplus, 
reinforcing Russia’s self-confidence in negotiations with the EU.  
These developments have clearly changed the paradigm of Russian 
foreign policy. Russia aims to protect its interests on its western borders 
as a result of the enlargements of NATO and the EU.17 President Putin 
in fact stated that Russia “should continue its civilising mission on the 
Eurasian continent”.18 In summer 2006 it became obvious that energy 
will play a major role in this ambitious endeavour.  
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The EU’s approach to foreign policy differs markedly from the 
Russian one in that the Union relies more on ‘soft power’. Thus, 
cooperation in fields of common interest is seen as mutually beneficial. 
The main instrument of foreign policy should ideally be regular dialogue 
and compromise in the framework of joint committees.19 While Russia 
puts a lot of emphasis on the importance of interests and spheres of 
influence, the EU stresses that the existence or development of common 
values is essential as a basis of successful cooperation.20 Naturally, the 
European Union does not ignore material interest. The energy dialogue 
is an example of an interest-driven policy. However, the EU usually 
encourages the convergence of its partners’ values with its own through 
socialisation and conditionality. Thus, in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, norms are inter alia to be promoted by 
strengthening civil society actors such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or the domestic opposition. ‘Naming and 
shaming’ is used as a means to create pressure. Low-level dialogues on 
technical matters allow for the socialisation of administrators. Experts 
are sent to the partner country to help adapt to European standards. 
Finally, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the agreements with the 
EU, the rhetoric usually stresses ‘partnership’ and ‘joint ownership’.21 In 
terms of political conditionality, the EU works “with carrots rather than 
sticks”.22 It favours the encouragement of reform through incentives 
rather than the discouragement of unwanted actions through threats. 
Thus, while Russia prefers hard bargaining about interests regarding 
the outcome as a zero-sum-game and is assertive, the EU would like to 
see mutually beneficial cooperation on both interests and values, in the 
spirit of partnership. Yet, Russia’s self-perception as a regional power 
makes it unwilling to become an object of European norm export and 
interference in its internal affairs.23 Thus, for the EU, one big question is 
whether its ‘soft’ approach will allow it to defend its objectives against 
Russian assertiveness.  
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B. Internal Divisions in the EU 
The second major challenge for the EU is maintaining its credibility 
towards Russia in the face of internal divisions. Indeed, several EU 
member states, in particular Germany, Italy under Berlusconi and 
France, have sought to boost their own international standing by 
claiming a special relationship with Russia.24 Being on good terms with 
influential Russia can bring advantages in terms of energy supplies (for 
example for Germany) or, more generally, enhanced prestige. Russia has 
developed sufficient understanding of the EU to exploit its member 
states’ ambitions and to play them off against each other or against the 
stricter positions of the EU institutions.25 Thus, Putin offers Germany 
closer energy relations and thereby reinforces existing divergences 
between Germany and the new member states in this sector. On the 
question of Kaliningrad, Putin could count on the support of France, 
Italy and Spain. Germany pledged to help Russia with its entry into the 
WTO during the negotiations. At the Russia-EU summit in November 
2003 Berlusconi defended Russia’s human rights policy in the Chechen 
war.26 Indeed, despite the fact that the European Parliament’s Belder 
Report underlined the need to adhere to common positions in order to 
maintain the EU’s credibility and in spite of Chris Patten’s plea for more 
unity, Germany, France and Italy continued to take a soft stance on 
Chechnya.27 On the other hand, the 2004 enlargement has brought 
several states into the EU that are critical of Russia and insist on the 
necessity to push for democratic reforms.28 The changes of government 
in Germany in 2005 and Italy in 2006 have raised hopes that a coherent 
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and credible common position on Russia might be easier to reach in the 
future.29 
 
III. The Failure of the EU’s Political Conditionality 
In its Communication on ‘Wider Europe’, the Commission stated 
that shared principles and values are the basis for “deeper political 
relations”.30 According to the official rhetoric, the special relationship 
between the European Union and Russia is based on common values 
and principles, and great importance is given to their promotion at least 
on paper.31 It is indeed questionable whether any form of strategic long-
term cooperation is possible between two partners if there is no or little 
similarity in outlook and fundamental values. For the EU and Russia, a 
common understanding of governance is of particular importance. In the 
absence of a common vision of how their common neighbourhood 
should evolve, Russia’s and the EU’s approaches in the region will not 
complement each other but clash. Their differences on the future of 
Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are an indication of these 
tensions. In the long term, these tensions could well backfire on other 
issues, such as the energy dialogue and the opening of markets. Indeed, 
it appears that one-and-a-half decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
the values of the two partners are diverging rather than converging. 
 
A. The Development of Democracy and Human Rights in 
Russia 
Europeans have become increasingly disappointed by the lack of 
progress in the democratisation of the Russian political system and the 
respect of human rights. The fact that Russia has never known long 
periods of stable democratic government, as well as the experience of 
sixty years of communism, complicates the transformation process. On 
top of that, President Putin’s reform course has actually led to de-
democratisation, while the Russian army is viewed as regularly violating 
human rights in the war in Chechnya.  
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Due to the Soviet legacy, trust in political parties is low and the 
establishment of a stable system of mass parties has failed. Many parties 
are based in the major cities with practically no members in the regions. 
The Russian President, by contrast, is regarded as standing above parties 
and possesses far more legitimacy in the eyes of the people.32 He selects 
his cabinet, parliamentary approval being necessary only for the 
appointment of the Prime Minister. Technocrats and candidates with a 
background in security services are largely overrepresented amongst the 
ministers, while few have party-political links.33  
The party system is fluid, with parties appearing and disappearing at 
every election.34 The nature of the parties themselves distorts the 
representative nature of the Duma. Oversloot distinguishes several types 
of ‘pseudo-parties’ in Russia. The party supporting the presidential 
candidate backed by the current power holders is most likely to win 
elections. This ‘party of power’ is supported by several ‘adjunct’ or 
‘satellite’ parties with similar programmes. ‘Favoured opposition 
parties’ express opposition to attract dissatisfied voters. But once elected 
they support those in power, turning voter dissatisfaction into support 
for the regime. Alternatively, their task is to attract some votes but not 
enough to pass the threshold. Finally, ‘harassment-parties’ confuse the 
voter by adopting a label or programme similar to that of a real 
opposition party or by presenting a candidate with a similar name.35 
The nature of the ‘party of power’ demonstrates the encroachment of 
the state upon the party system. In a democracy, a political party wins 
the election and then forms the government. Inversely, in Russia, the 
‘party of power’ is an ad hoc creation by the power holders that then 
usually wins the elections. It centres around the executive and especially 
the candidate likely to win the presidential election.36 
After the Beslan school siege in 2004, President Putin engaged in 
reforms strengthening state power with the aim of enhancing Russia’s 
stability. These reforms have contributed to a further weakening of the 
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party system and de-democratisation of the country.37 The abolition of 
single-member constituencies that were used to distribute part of the 
seats in the Duma weakened independent regional parties. These smaller 
parties are less likely to pass the five percent threshold in the now purely 
proportional elections to the Duma than the national parties.38 Similarly, 
the abolition of direct elections of the regional governors and the power 
of the President to nominate the governors with the approval of the local 
legislature led to a dwindling of the capacity of regional parties to 
influence the regional executives. Moreover, the state usually plays an 
important role in the creation of parties. However, the new heads of the 
regions are now unlikely to create opposition parties, as their career 
depends on those in power at the central state level.39  
In 2005, the role of the Duma was further undermined by the 
creation of a ‘third chamber’ supervising the media, the government and 
the Duma itself. The appointment of its members is once again strongly 
influenced by the power holders. One third of its members are chosen by 
the President in consultation with NGOs, this third then chooses the 
remainder of the members from national and regional NGOs.40 
NGOs are intimidated through taxation, controls and limitations to 
the right to assembly.41 The press is also curtailed. The broadcasting 
media are state-controlled, and several critical newspapers have changed 
their owner and apparently lost their independence since 2005. Thus, the 
newspaper Iswestija was bought by the state-owned enterprise 
Gasprom, while the editor of Kommersant had to leave one month after 
the paper was taken over by the manager of an enterprise affiliated with 
Gasprom. Gorbachov, who used to be a critic of Putin, now partly owns 
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Nowaja Gaseta and defends Putin’s politics as guaranteeing Russia’s 
stability, even in Chechnya.42 
Despite technical assistance from the EU to facilitate the reform of 
Russia’s judicial system, corruption continues to hinder the effective 
enforcement of rights and duties.43 The arrest of Yukos boss Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky has given the impression that even the judicial system 
serves as an instrument of state power.44 
The decision at the EU-Russia summit of November 2004 to hold 
human rights consultations every six months does not appear to have led 
to concrete progress. The European Union is still dissatisfied with 
Russian disrespect of human rights in the conflict in Chechnya.45 Yet, 
Russia insists on the domestic nature of the conflict and rejects foreign 
interference. The EU has begun to accept this interpretation while 
continuing to criticise the situation.46 The ‘hunt for Georgians’ in 
autumn 2006 that officially aims at reducing the number of illegal 
immigrants from Georgia on Russian territory does little to improve 
Russia’s image. Indeed, Europe regards these measures both as a 
reprisal against Georgia’s pro-Western course and as a expression of 
rising xenophobia and extremism in Russia.47 
As a consequence of Putin’s policies, Russia has experienced an 
increasingly authoritarian regime with a weakened parliamentary and 
party political system as well as controlled media and NGOs. As 
pluralism and regional power are reduced, the ‘shared values’ of 
democracy, fundamental freedoms, respect of human rights and the rule 
of law appear more and more to be rhetoric rather than reality. While 
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Russia is ready to sign up to these values in declarations and documents 
such as in the framework of the Common Space of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, it is less willing to implement them in practice – at least not 
in the way the EU interprets them.48 Admittedly, it is not an easy task for 
the EU to change the direction of Putin’s reforms since the Russian 
President is popular despite the fact that only 25 percent of Russians 
regard him as democratic.49 But, without shared values and no sign of 
value-based convergence, the ‘strategic partnership’ resembles a 
selective form of interest-based cooperation.50  
 
B. A Lack of ‘Carrots’, Unity and Political Will 
The EU’s main instruments for value transfer and the promotion of 
democracy in its enlargement, neighbourhood and development policies 
are conditionality and socialisation. Whereas conditionality is a 
bargaining strategy that seeks to bring a target government to comply 
with conditions in return for rewards, socialisation aims at achieving the 
societal acceptance of norms and values through fostering contacts 
between the two partners at all levels. Socialisation works best if the 
target society identifies to some extent with the culture of the 
‘exporting’ country.51 
Schimmelfennig’s study of rule transfer in the context of the 
enlargement to central and eastern Europe revealed that the most 
appropriate explanatory model is the external incentives model, i.e. 
conditionality, rather than the socialisation model. According to this 
rationalist model, “a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards 
exceed the domestic adaptation cost”.52 The EU’s credibility is related to 
its capacity to withhold benefits in cases of non-compliance and its 
consistency in insisting on the fulfilment of its conditions. Secondary 
factors are the “size and speed” of the benefits involved and the 
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“determinacy of conditions”, i.e. to what extent it is clear what a country 
has to do to get a certain type of benefit.53 
The case studies showed that strongly authoritarian governments 
were less willing to engage in value-related rule transfer because 
“[d]emocratic rules would have required these governments to give up 
the instruments on which their political power rested.”54 Thus, 
“successful rule transfer required prior political change at the level of 
governments that brought democratic, reform-orientated political forces 
into power.”55 However, the EU may have facilitated domestic change 
through the delegitimation of the anti-integrationist elite and the support 
of domestic opposition or civil society actors.56 
The application of this model to EU-Russia relations reveals several 
problems. The European Union has less to offer as neither of the 
partners desires a future Russian accession to the EU. Consequently, the 
EU has to work with smaller incentives such as market access, energy, 
investment, cooperation on visas and security issues.  
Secondly, the EU’s conditionality currently lacks credibility, as the 
EU does not dispose of the superiority that it had in the enlargement 
negotiations.57 While the EU had little to lose in the case of the central 
and eastern European countries, a large share of its energy supply comes 
from Russia, the stability of its neighbourhood depends on Russian 
cooperation and it could benefit from agreements on cross-border crime. 
Consequently, several material interests coexist with the wish to 
promote democratisation and human rights in Russia, so that the 
credibility of political conditionality depends on the priority the EU 
attaches to values. However, the EU reacted to human rights violations 
in Chechnya and the de-democratising reforms of President Putin with 
verbal criticism only. It faces a dilemma: it can either abandon areas of 
cooperation of interest to itself and disengage from the non-compliant 
country or continue to cooperate, lose its credibility and appear to 
legitimise the regime.58 Indeed, “while democracy always comes top in 
the speeches, in practice it has to find a more modest place in a complex 
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set of often competing and sometimes contradictory interests.”59 The 
main weakness of the EU may well be its reluctance or inability to 
establish clear priorities among its various interests. 
A further element of the EU’s lack of credibility are the still 
diverging positions of some member states on the importance of values. 
In the absence of Berlusconi there may no longer be statements of 
support for Russia’s policy in Chechnya, but the tripartite meeting of 
Chancellor Merkel, President Chirac and President Putin in the Château 
de Compiègne in September 2006 carefully avoided the topics of 
fundamental freedoms and Chechnya.60 The summit at Lahti in October 
2006 revealed the same split between ‘softer’ countries such as France, 
the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany and the more critical new 
member states.61 
In addition, not only can the Russian elite apparently gain the benefit 
it wants without compliance, but it would even have to pay a high price 
if it were to comply. After all, democratisation of the state would expose 
the power holders to the risk of losing their grip on the state, while they 
are currently well-established in Russia’s “managed democracy”.62  
Finally, even the less effective socialisation approach is currently 
hard to apply to Russia due to the low identification of Russia with the 
EU. Only a few ‘liberal Westernisers’ are left who would be willing to 
argue in favour of a Western democracy and market economy as a 
model for Russia.63 
Thus, the EU’s approach to EU-Russia relations has so far failed to 
generate a convergence of values. It displays a number of weaknesses, 
most notably internal division and lack of clear priorities that render 
future success unlikely. The question is whether the ‘strategic 
partnership’ has allowed the EU to develop a clear vision in a field 
where a substantial interest is at stake – the energy dialogue.  
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IV. EU-Russian Energy Dialogue - A Conflictual 
Interdependence 
According to the European Security Strategy, “energy dependence is 
a special concern for Europe”.64 Russia is the most important single 
supplier of crude oil (25 percent) and natural gas (25 percent) for the EU 
and this dependence will continue to grow.65 According to a projection 
of the European Commission, the EU-25 will import more than half of 
their natural gas needs from the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) by the year 2030.66 On the other hand, the EU is Russia’s most 
important trading partner and 57 percent of all Russian import earnings 
to the EU derive from energy sales.67 This dependence on the export of 
energy to the EU’s internal market has created a vital Russian interest in 
securing foreign investments and in ensuring access to that market. 
Given this strong interdependence, one would expect the EU to have 
a strategic vision of how to approach Russia in the field of energy. 
Indeed, there are several institutionalised forms of collaboration with 
Russia in this field. But the question remains whether the EU uses its 
strengths in a coherent and efficient way.   
 
A. A Gap between Rhetoric and Reality 
Launched by the EU and Russia at a bilateral summit in Paris in 
2000, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was embedded in the framework 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It shows the importance 
that both sides attribute to energy-related topics, particularly with regard 
to security of supply, efficiency, infrastructure, investment and trade. 
The dialogue aims at institutionalising an economic relationship 
between the two neighbours in view of the potential to deepen this 
relationship and ensure mutual predictability. It is surprising that the 
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complementary Energy Charter is not at the centre of the Dialogue, the 
Russian refusal to ratify the Energy Charter symbolising for many the 
EU’s failure to attain its objectives.68 The Energy Charter had entered 
into force in 1998 as a “commonly accepted foundation […] for 
developing energy cooperation between the states of the Eurasian 
continent”.69 Based on the principles of market economy, mutual 
assistance and non-discrimination, it was supposed to serve as a 
multilateral framework of legally binding rules dealing with 
intergovernmental cooperation in the energy sector. The refusal of the 
Russian Duma to ratify the agreement demonstrates the lack of 
willingness on the Russian side to abide by commonly agreed legal 
rights and obligations in the field of energy.70 During the EU summit in 
Lahti in October 2006 the Russian reluctance was confirmed. In the 
words of President Putin, Russia is not “against the principles laid down 
in the Energy Charter but we believe that certain provisions need to be 
further specified, or a different document needs to be developed on the 
basis of the same principles as the Energy Charter”.71  
In fact, Russia refuses to grant access to its energy market following 
a two-fold strategy based on the wish to strengthen its economic 
position and to gain control over its main energy suppliers. The aim is to 
develop a strong political tool for Russia’s economic and foreign 
policies. Its flagship in this is state-owned Gasprom,72 a company that 
holds more than a quarter of the world’s reserves in gas and that is 
Russia’s most important single investor abroad.73 The EU, in turn, is 
driven by the logic of liberalisation, pushing Russia to open its market 
so that EU companies can gain some control over energy resources. 
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B. Russia’s Realist and Strategic Energy Policy 
The conflict over the ratification of the Energy Charter is sparked by 
colliding interests with regard to the control of pipelines and the transit 
of energy. Russia has decided not to sacrifice control over its energy 
resources and infrastructure, even in negotiations over its accession to 
the WTO.74 It is determined to tighten its control over its most important 
good by internal and external measures. The declared goal of Russian 
politics is to reinforce Gasprom’s position in Europe. In addition, recent 
events demonstrate that Russia has the political will and ability to 
influence external actors in its effort to protect its sphere of influence.  
The North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP, Nord Stream), directly 
connecting Russian gas fields with Germany, is an example of Russia’s 
capacity to undermine the Union’s energy policy through bilateral 
agreements.75 The pipeline will deepen the relationship between Russia 
as the most important supplier of gas and Germany as its most important 
single customer causing tensions within the EU. This strategy consists 
of “building on the vast foundation of bilateral business ties” with 
individual heads of state and government in an attempt to challenge the 
EU’s unity in the energy sector.76 
A second example of deviation from the norms and values that 
should govern the PCA is the development of the Shtokman natural gas 
field.77 In announcing the objective of retaining complete ownership of 
one of the biggest gas fields in Russia, Gasprom unexpectedly dropped 
plans to let Western firms participate in its exploitation.78  
Thirdly, Russia has not hesitated to use its gas monopoly to exert 
political pressure on neighbouring governments such as Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine. The energy crisis between the Kremlin 
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and Ukraine was first and foremost the expression of a political crisis 
triggered by Russian opposition to the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the 
electoral victory of presidential candidate Yushchenko. Gasprom 
announced a five-fold increase in the price of gas in the aftermath of the 
elections in November 2004. The crisis was finally solved by the 
conclusion of an agreement (forcing the Ukraine to pay twice the 
amount for Russian gas), but it had a long-term effect on the EU’s 
awareness of Russia’s new assertiveness.  
 
C. A New European Assertiveness and Coherence? 
Russia’s refusal to ratify the Energy Charter, together with the events 
in Ukraine, had a direct impact on some EU member states and changed 
the EU’s approach to Russia in the field of energy policy. The directly 
affected Baltic states and Poland expressed their concerns in their 
national security concepts.79 At the level of the European Council, it was 
acknowledged that Russia may be rather a political and geostrategical 
risk than a reliable partner in questions of energy. 
In the light of these events, during the European Council of March 
2006, the Heads of State or Government of the EU-25 emphasised the 
“need to safeguard energy security” in Europe and announced the 
establishment of an Energy Policy for Europe (EPE).80 In all relevant 
EU documents, reference is made to the diplomatic component of the 
dialogue with Russia. A recent Commission communication summarises 
the interests and tools the EU considers adequate to pursue a more 
coherent and self-confident energy policy towards Russia.81 With 
Chancellor Merkel in Germany and former Commission President 
Romano Prodi as Prime Minister in Italy, it will become more difficult 
for Russian President Putin to rely on personal relationships in the 
pursuit of Russia’s energy policy.  
The EU is more aware than ever of the necessity to ‘speak with one 
voice’ in the field of energy policy, especially when dealing with Russia. 
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The fear of energy being used as a ‘political weapon’ has triggered a 
stronger sense of common interest in European capitals. Nonetheless, 
institutionalised dialogue and ad hoc diplomatic approaches remain the 
main tools in this strategy so far.  
 
V. Conclusion: A Difficult Choice for the Future 
In contrast to the ENP countries, the EU faces in Russia a country 
that has regained foreign policy influence. Yet, it is not Russia’s 
strength in itself that impedes the development of a strategic partnership. 
In fact, it could easily be argued that Russia offers the EU the unique 
possibility of building long-term cooperation between equal partners. 
What really complicates the EU’s task are its own internal divisions and 
its own undecidedness and Russia’s new self-confidence.  
Thus far, the EU has failed in its attempts to construct a genuine 
‘strategic partnership’ with Russia.82 It has not managed to build the 
basis of common values generally regarded as necessary for successful 
long-term cooperation. Russia’s assets and its self-perception as a 
Eurasian rather than European country and as a great power have made 
the use of conditionality and socialisation more difficult. Moreover, the 
EU emphasises the importance of democracy, respect for human rights 
and the rule of law, but has failed to go beyond rhetoric in its reaction to 
human rights violations in Chechnya or the de-democratising trends in 
Russia. It has thereby eroded the credibility of conditionality. In 
addition, the policies of Germany, France and Italy have undermined the 
European rhetoric on values. Russia has understood that it can push the 
limits of tolerance very far in negotiations with the EU.83  
The situation in the energy sector is one example for the EU’s failure 
to use its economic power for the attainment of foreign policy goals. Of 
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course, Russia has the advantage of energy resources on which the EU 
crucially depends. Yet at the same time, Russia has failed to diversify its 
economy, so that the country is highly dependent on its energy exports 
and thus on its main client Europe. Only if the EU is able to present 
itself as a single actor, it can be more than Russia’s equal in 
negotiations. But thus far, European attempts at opening up Russia’s 
energy market have not succeeded. Again, some member states have 
sacrificed a strong European position on the altar of their own ‘special 
relationships’. But there are signs that the EU-25 move closer in 
reaction to the Russian use of energy as a political tool. The 
establishment of an Energy Policy for Europe demonstrates the new 
awareness of European governments and a new willingness to deal with 
Russia on the basis of commonly defined interests and goals.  
Nevertheless, this new approach has yet to be put into practice. The 
EU now has a unique chance to do so. EU-Russian negotiations for a 
new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement were due to start in 
November 2006. However, Russia’s ambassador to the EU, Vladimir 
Chizhov stated in autumn 2006 that he believes that “any cooperation 
including foreign policy cooperation between different countries and 
organisations is primarily based on interests.”84 He emphasised that 
insistence on values from the European side may be unhelpful.85 Also, 
official negotiations have been considerably delayed by a row over a 
Russian ban on Polish meat imports. The tensions between Estonia and 
Russia over the relocation of a Russian war memorial, the intensity of 
the Russian response to NATO plans for anti-missile defence and the 
lack of a common vision for Moldova and the Kosovo further underline 
the fragile nature of EU-Russia relations.86 Thus, the EU now faces a 
choice: it can either cooperate with Russia when their interests happen 
to converge or insist stronger on its own priorities and objectives. The 
former would lead to pragmatic, interest-based cooperation. This 
conciliatory stance may well lead to cooperation, but on Russia’s terms. 
Alternatively, the EU might draw up a list of clear priorities – whether 
these are energy or values – bargain hard for these objectives and accept 
tensions. As one Commission official emphasised, pragmatic 
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cooperation on Russian terms will not suffice to generate change.87 
Barysch argues that Russia might actually feel more at ease with an EU 
bargaining for the recognition of its well-defined interests, as this would 
be more in line with the Russian approach.88  
If the EU managed to focus on priorities, its chances of success 
might well improve. It could push for some changes, offering 
concessions on other points in return. As Vinatier points out, the EU 
does not need to accept that Russia dictates the terms, as it can provide 
incentives, especially in the economic sphere. Russia needs European 
investment to diversify and modernise its economy because Russian 
resources either flow back into the energy sector or are invested abroad. 
Russia experiences important problems in parts of the agricultural sector 
and relies on a relatively high amount of European meat imports.89 
Hence, the EU could exchange economic support for progress on the 
value-side.90 It could then base its future relationship with Russia on 
stronger conditionality resembling that of the ENP action plans.  
At any rate, whether the EU wishes to focus on values or interests, it 
has to rethink its strategy. If, during the forthcoming negotiations with 
Russia, it is not determined to define and pursue its main priorities and 
room for manoeuvre and if the member states continue to undermine the 
common position for the sake of their own objectives, then the EU risks 
another decade of unsatisfying piece-meal cooperation without much 
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